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ideas of blasphemy; the potential alliance between elements of political right and left over pornography. Overall, though, the period in question has witnessed a shift from censorship to offence. Explicit bans upon literature have virtually vanished. Yet public discourse about the offensiveness of creative expression has not ceased.
The 1970s
' [F] or many politicized Britons', asserts Andy Beckett, 'the decade was not the hangover after the sixties; it was when the great sixties party actually got started ' (2009: 209) . In a sense this applies also to the liberalization of print. Yet in the 1970s one can discern a backlash against the previous decade's liberalizing motion. The early 1970s witnessed campaigns against obscenity, from members of the public and from figures in authority. These did not primarily affect literature, but they did threaten to change the law in ways that could have altered the climate for writers. Kenneth Tynan's review Oh! Calcutta!, staged at Camden's Roundhouse in 1970, was not prosecuted despite its heavily sexual and scatological content. As the venue was in part subsidized by the Arts Council, many commentators were angry that taxpayers' money was underwriting this display of obscenity. This mood was evidenced by the formation of the Festival of Light movement in 1971. That September, this movement against the permissive society staged large rallies in Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park.
The Obscene Publications Act and subsequent legal proceedings had cleared the way for literary works to be published with impunity. Yet prosecutions were brought against publications on other grounds. These included the charge of 'conspiracy to corrupt public morals', under which the International Times was put out of business for its 'contact ads' in 1970 (Sutherland 1982: 104-5) . The same charge was mounted against the counter-cultural magazine OZ the following year. The magazine was also charged under the 1953 Postal Act, as an indecent article sent by mail, and under the Obscene Publications Act itself. The longest obscenity trial to date in Britain, the OZ trial was the most prominent since the Chatterley proceedings.
More explicitly than that case, it represented a confrontation between the establishment and a dissident milieu. The legal defence was led by John Mortimer, who handled most high-profile obscenity trials in the period. After a 27-day day trial, Judge Argyle found the magazine's Australian proprietors guilty of publishing obscene articles and abusing the postal service. He handed down sentences of jail and deportation. The defendants' long hair was shaved while they were remanded in custody. This seemed a gratuitously vengeful strike at counter-cultural style. The defendants were granted bail, however, and their appeal was heard in November 4 1971. As in the case of Last Exit to Brooklyn, a verdict which seemed to have changed the course of cultural history was rapidly enough overturned. Charges of obscenity were now rejected on the grounds that such material could have an emetic, rather than arousing effect.
The Labour peer Lord Longford was a Roman Catholic and a leading figure in the Festival of Light movement. In 1971 he set up a 50-strong committee which deliberated for 16 months and finally produced a 520-page report on pornography.
The report was Longford's own independent initiative rather than a government commission. It reflected his disquiet at the success of Oh! Calcutta! and at the spread of pornography more generally. It proposed new legislation, in which the 'public good' of the Obscene Publications Act would, crucially, be unavailable. Instead of the definition of obscenity, in practice since the Act of 1857, as having a tendency to deprave or corrupt, the new definition would be of material 'whose effect, taken as a whole, is to outrage contemporary standards of decency or humanity accepted by the public at large'. This would be a more difficult criterion for a publisher to pass, and the abolition of a 'public good' test would make the prosecution of literary works more likely, returning the legal situation to its pre-Chatterley state. Longford's report was debated at length in the House of Lords, but it was not to be taken up by the government as the basis of legislation. Rather it stood as the testimony of an alleged 'silent majority' who were unhappy with the recent tendency of liberalization, and in particular with the more extreme productions of the pornographic industry.
In this it can be aligned with the Viewers and Listeners' Association (VALA), founded in 1965 by Mary Whitehouse. The formidable campaigner Whitehouse was among the loudest spokespeople for a reaction against the liberalizing tide, especially in relation to broadcasting. During the 1970s she also sought to prosecute several publications. Her most conspicuous success in this regard concerned the fortnightly paper Gay News. In 1976 it featured James Kirkup's lengthy poem 'The Love That Dares To Speak Its Name', with an illustration. The poem is narrated by a Roman soldier who takes the body of Jesus Christ down from the cross and manages to have sexual intercourse with it. The poem's tone is sometimes solemn:
So now I took off my uniform, and, naked, lay together with him in his desolation, caressing every shadow of his cooling flesh, hugging him and trying to warm him back to life.
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It is also sometimes saucy, imagining a promiscuous Christ who 'loved all men' and seeking doubles entendres. The crucified messiah is 'well hung'; the Roman soldier repeatedly ejaculates, 'as if each coming was my last'. In its sometimes pious diction -the soldier remembers this sexual encounter as occurring 'on that green hill far away' -the poem resembles an Edwardian or Georgian elegy as much as anything fractiously counter-cultural. It is, in any case, a literary text. In this respect it gained a relatively rare distinction in being banned in Britain after 1970. Mary Whitehouse did not seek to suppress the poem under the Obscene Publications Act. That Act had already proved an insufficient basis in court to proscribe even Inside Linda Lovelace (1976), the plainly mercenary ghostwritten memoir of an American pornographic actress. Instead Whitehouse initiated a private prosecution for blasphemous libel, against Gay News and its editor Denis Lemon.
This was an unexpected legal revival. The last imprisonment for blasphemy had been in 1921. A tacit presumption had settled that the charge was no longer an appropriate basis for prosecution. Lord Denning stated in 1949 that the blasphemy law was a 'dead letter'. Religion was often enough the target of at least gentle satire. Mary Whitehouse's redeployment of the law was thus a blast from the legal past.
Defending Gay News in court, John Mortimer complained that it was 'as if we had been whisked on some time machine back to the middle ages'. The judge nonetheless ruled that Kirkup's poem was 'the most scurrilous profanity' (Sutherland 1982: 153-4) . The jury followed his lead and agreed that the paper was guilty of blasphemous libel. So did the Law Lords on appeal.
A new, old way had apparently been found to prohibit literature. Its subsequent effect would, in practice, be limited. In 2002 the gay rights campaigner Peter Tatchell led a public reading of Kirkup's poem, challenging the authorities to prosecute. When they did not do so, Tatchell repeated -this time with more immediate basis -Denning's claim that the blasphemy law was a dead letter. In 2005 the group Christian Voice and the Christian Institute sought to obtain a ban on Jerry Springer: The Opera, but the case was dismissed on the grounds that the Theatres Act assured theatrical works the right of free expression. ' (1981: 19) . He finds inconsistencies and areas of incoherence, and records that 'almost all of our witnesses' wanted the 'deprave or corrupt' test of 1959 to be abolished, possibly to be replaced by more readily usable terms. He notes an apparent contradiction, raised by numerous witnesses, in the 1959 Act's implication that a work can 'deprave and corrupt' and yet be for the 'public good': 'as though it could be for the public good that readers be depraved and corrupted, so long as it was by art ' (1981: 15) .
Williams also notes a change in practical legal norms: 'experience in recent years has been of an astonishing contraction in the range of what juries determine to be obscene ' (1981: 11) . One synoptic paragraph describing the situation since 1959 makes plain what he considers 'the retreat of the law from the written word ' (1981: 35) . After the earnestly argued cases of Lady Chatterley's Lover and Last Exit to Brooklyn, Williams asserts, the 1976 acquittal of the flimsier Inside Linda Lovelace had announced a 'further, perhaps final stage'. The police had opined to Williams' committee that 'the failure of that prosecution meant that the law was unlikely to be invoked again against the written word. Their view (which appeared from his summing-up to have been shared by the trial judge) was that it was difficult to imagine what written material would be regarded as obscene if that was not ' (1981: 35).
Williams' report reflects on the balance of free expression and society's need to check it, grounding itself in the liberal philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Williams 1981: 53-6) . The committee makes a 'presumption in favour of freedom of expression' (57), and argues that the suppression of any written ideas in deference to contemporary mores may be an offence against the unknown future in which the free development of ideas could lead to altered values (56). From these profoundly liberal foundations, it accepts 'harm' as the major reason for prohibiting an item.
Harms might be to the consumers of material themselves (for instance, people who would be degraded by excessive pornography), or they might be to others, causally resulting from obscene materials (for instance, the victims of sexual assaults which were encouraged or conditioned by pornography). Williams also envisages a generalized harm to the social environment -the 'cultural pollution' of generalized pornography, as was then visible in Soho (59) -though he expresses doubt about the exact nature of the harm in such cases. He describes the committee's view that pornography should be seen an epiphenomenon of social change, more effect than cause: 'to regard pornography as having a crucial or even a significant effect on essential social values' is to get the problem 'out of proportion' (95).
The committee ultimately proposes that existing laws on obscenity and pornography be torn up, and new legislation introduced to replace it. The existing concepts of obscenity, indecency and the purported 'tendency to deprave or corrupt' are all to be abandoned, in favour of the term 'offensive'. The 'public good defence', such a signal element of the 1959 Act, is to be scrapped as unworkable, with the reassurance that material acting in the public good is unlikely to be found offensive anyway (126). Williams rejects the outright prohibition of all but the most extreme material, for instance that in the making of which minors are harmed. He proposes instead that existing obscenity laws be replaced by a thoroughgoing policy of 'restriction'. Thus pornographic material could not be exhibited in public or on the open shelves of a newsagent's, but only sold behind the closed doors of specially marked premises. This satisfies twin requirements, on one hand to preserve the liberty of the individual consumer and on the other to preserve the freedom of the rest of the public from the affront of pornography as it goes about its business. In a summarizing formulation, Williams specifies that 'Restrictions should apply to matter (other than the printed word) and to a performance whose unrestricted availability is offensive to reasonable people by reason of the manner in which it portrays, deals with or relates to violence, cruelty or horror, or sexual, faecal or urinary functions or genital organs ' (1981: 160) .
In the present context, the most significant element of this declaration is in the parenthesis: 'other than the printed word'. Williams had determined that print should be excluded from censorship. The committee argues that the written word is qualitatively different from still pictures or film. Summarizing the rationale, 8 Williams writes that 'The printed word should be neither restricted nor prohibited since its nature makes it neither immediately offensive nor capable of involving the harms we identify, and because of its importance in conveying ideas' (160). Whereas a pornographic image can suddenly confront and offend the unwary pedestrian in a public place, written pornography requires dedicated perusal to have the same effect. It is thus far more easily avoided, and in effect is only active upon those who choose to engage with it. Hence it needs no special spatial restriction to prevent its being a public nuisance. In the Preface to the 1981 edition of his report Williams acknowledges that this element of the committee's recommendations has 'attracted misunderstanding': 'Some have concluded from this that we must suppose literature to have a less significant effect on people than photographs do'. Williams denies this.
He clarifies again that the distinction pertains to 'immediate involuntary offensiveness':
'quite simply, to be offended by written material requires the activity of reading it'.
He adds that there are no grounds for prohibiting print either, as the criterion for prohibition, harm to participants, 'does not apply to written material at all' (x).
In the main body of the report, Williams also avers that besides speech, the written word is 'the principal medium for the advocacy of opinions'. He makes it clear that whatever is to be considered offensive about pornography under the law, it is not its advocacy of any particular opinion, even the promotion of a '"swinging" life-style' (100). A broader point is being made here about freedom of expression:
Clearly some publications could have the effect of outraging or deeply upsetting many people because of the opinions or view of the world they advocated, which those who were outraged found deeply offensive to their own beliefs and outlook. However, many people would think that it would be contrary to basic principles of free expression even to restrict, let alone suppress, publications on this ground alone (as opposed, for instance, to controlling them on the ground that they incited to riot). (100) The Williams Committee was primarily concerned with sexuality, obscenity and pornography. Yet in subsequent years, debate over the right to publish would revolve at least as much around those matters of 'opinion' and 'view of the world' that Williams had understandably treated as irrelevant to his remit. In the meantime, his committee had issued in a document remarkable for its lucidity and sober liberalism. If enacted, the report's recommendations would formally decriminalize the written word altogether. The most serious challenge to Brenton's play came through legal channels.
Mary Whitehouse never saw the play, but was informed that was indecent. She persuaded Scotland Yard's Obscene Publications Squad to examine the production, and unsuccessfully urged the Attorney General to prosecute those responsible. In earlier cases she had demonstrated her ingenuity in finding unsuspected legal avenues of attack. Now she found another. The 1968 Theatres Act appeared to guarantee the freedom of the stage. But owing to a small loophole in that Act, the play might be found guilty of the crime of gross indecency, under the Sexual Offences Act of 1956. Michael Bogdanov, as director, was accused of 'procuring' the indecency between the two actors involved in the Roman's attempted rape. In effect, the onstage scene was being treated as equivalent to a sexual encounter in a public convenience. As Richard Boon comments, 'the case turned on the question of whether the simulation of an act of gross indecency was itself an act of gross indecency ' (1991: 176) .
It is worth emphasizing the difference here between the play's status and that of prose fiction. Plainly, much fiction had been decried and, before the period covered by this essay, banned, for its 'simulation' of sexual acts -not just rape like that shown by Brenton, but consensual sexual intercourse in general. In the historical John Sutherland, writing in 1982 (188) , suggested that the 'canny' Whitehouse was content to have made her point -and hence to have left a Sword of Damocles hanging over British theatre. Geoffrey Robertson of the defence team would claim that Hutchinson had dismantled Ross-Cornes' credibility, and that the trial's discontinuation was the retreat of a defeated foe. Contrastingly, Mark Lawson (2005) speculates that Kennedy suffered a crisis of conscience, realizing that the defendant could be jailed on what was a spurious charge. Whatever the motives involved, the trial's outcome was nobody's resounding victory.
Brenton's play was taken to court for its 'indecent' depiction of an act of sexual violence. But for many commentators, the sense lingers that other things were more tacitly at stake. Richard Boon has offered a full expression of this view, proposing that the play was a useful occasion 'for a number of figures, inside and outside government, who wished both to test and to reinforce the new "moral climate" of the early eighties'. Its sexual content and obscene language were presented as evidence of the decline in moral standards since the 1960s. Its scepticism about nationalism and heritage contradicted Thatcherism's keenness for them. Its treatment of British military involvement in Ireland, Boon adds, 'lay behind and fuelled much of the criticism it received'. Finally, its controversial occupation of the National Theatre, and specifically of its main stage, facilitated the complaint that state sponsorship should be withheld from such 'scandalous' artistic work: a view readily in keeping with Conservative scepticism about arts funding (Boon 1991: 209) Exemplary was Ronald Butt, a relentless campaigner against obscenity, who reasoned in The Times that 'the minority who buy and read the poem are unlikely to have their language or their spirit corrupted by it. However, it was another matter when it was decided that Mr Harrison should read it on Channel 4 late at night and that it should go into people's homes' (55). He likewise castigated Bernard Levin (an eloquent advocate for Harrison as he had been for Brenton) for quoting the poem in the newspaper: 'families' would be 'faced with obscenity on the breakfast table' (55).
John Sutherland (1982) , surveying censorship's history, repeatedly stresses the distinction between expensive hardbacks or small-press productions, and massmarket paperbacks. What sometimes passes untroubled in the former class becomes explosive in the latter. Offence, it seems, is not only about a text's content, but its 13 practical availability and cultural visibility. In v.'s case, television clearly plays the cheap paperback's role. By 1987 obscenity in literature was unproblematic. But televised literature remained another matter. Blake Morrison, introducing the poem in the Independent, asserted that in such controversies 'the true source of dispute differs from the stated one'. The Romans in Britain, he adjudged, had offended not for 'nudity and buggery' but for its 'contentious history'. Likewise, the real shock of v. was its bleak portrait of 'a divided society' (Harrison 1989: 56 ). An equivalent case might be made for the Scottish socialist James Kelman's how late it was how late (1994), whose Booker Prize win provoked yet another four-letter-word furore. The novel tells the story of an impoverished, persecuted Glaswegian, Sammy, in a third-person narrative which permits itself ready access to his rhythms of thought. A sentence like the following is quite typical:
No if it was the worst ye had, if it was the worst; cause it was fucking happening and it wasnay a nightmare it was right fucking now, right fucking now so okay, okay, ye still had to relax, ye still had to take it easy, okay, ye had to get it under control, it wasnay a time for cracking up, we've all cracked up, we know what fucking cracking up means, this wasnay a time for it, know what I'm saying, this wasnay a time for it, so there's nay fucking problem ye just let it go, let it go. (Kelman 1994: 44) We notice a number of features. The sentence is about 'cracking up', the mental stress of poverty and disenfranchisement. It rolls ahead, unconcerned with elegance or a quick ending: it depicts the monologue with which the protagonist talks himself into continuity and survival. The English is idiomatic -'ye', 'wasnay': this is a deliberately localized language, forged in phonetic defiance of Standard English and in attempted solidarity with the Scottish subject (Kelman 1992: 82) . It is in this context that we read the repeated word 'fucking'. Clearly, the word's literal association with sex is long discarded here. It is serving as an intensifier, emphasizing a quality -'right fucking now'. It also serves as a way of registering the character's incredulity or annoyance, distancing himself from a position: 'nay fucking problem'. Blake Morrison (1994) reckoned that 'fuck' appeared four thousand times in the book, and mischievously deduced that 'the word appears on average a mere ten times a page'. The word is too prevalent to retain the force we might associate with it in other contexts, where it can convey great anger or threat, and provoke shock. Rather, for Kelman's character it has become like a piece of punctuation, an item of semantic furniture so standard that a paragraph without it might look suspiciously bereft.
Some were unsettled or annoyed by the acclaim given to Kelman. The Booker judge Rabbi Julia Neuberger distanced herself from the award, hardly raising the tone in declaring the novel 'crap'. The journalist Simon Jenkins more colourfully dubbed the novel 'literary vandalism' and likened Kelman to an 'illiterate savage' (Jordison 2011) . Kelman himself used the award ceremony as the occasion for a protest about the suppression of 'indigenous' language from outside London. This is one more case, therefore, of a controversy over obscenity which opened on to broader social and aesthetic divides. The novelist A.L. Kennedy has opined that 'A lot of the reviews that complained about the language were actually complaining about the type of people who were being portrayed because they weren't the type of people who would be allowed in a "nice" novel. [...] The problem with Kelman was never that he said "Fuck", it was that he wrote about the wrong kind of people' (Dale 2002: 24) . Kennedy's case may be overstated. By the end of the twentieth century, the notion of an exclusively 'nice' novel with which the London Establishment is repressing literary expression seems something of a straw target.
But Kelman stands as an extreme case of writing that treats 'obscene' words as a regular, indispensable part of the rhythm of thought and speech, to the point where whatever was supposed to be obscene about the word becomes hard to recall.
'Liberal Censorship' and Literary Obscenity
Within Western democracies, censorship has often been associated with the illiberal intuitions of the political Right. But during the period in question here, debates on the value of censorship also proliferated across the Left. Some debated, for instance, whether material alleged to be racist should be available in school libraries. Probably the longest-standing site of what Peter Barry (1992: 233) calls 'liberal censorship', and John Sutherland (1982: 191) 'the censorship of Enlightenment', is feminism. In urging economic and political equality for women, the movement has also frequently complained at the representation of women (and indeed men) in the media, advertising and the arts. Feminists have alleged that reactionary depictions of women, fictional as they may be, affect real-world perceptions, and hence damage the cause of equality and justice between the sexes. Probably the extreme case of this complaint is pornography. It is commonly alleged that pornography presents a demeaning vision of women, which may affect the perceptions of those who encounter it. It is sometimes further alleged that pornography has helped to fuel male sexual assault. A feminist slogan of the 1970s puts it pithily: 'Pornography is 15 the theory, rape is the practice' (Morgan 1977) These improvise elaborate descriptions of women's clothes and bodies: 'the white silk shirt shaped by the way it hangs from her etcetera I mean BREASTS, silk shirt not quite reaching the thick harness-leather belt which is not holding up the miniskirt but hangs in the loops round the waistband of the white suede miniskirt supported by her hips and unbuttoned as high as the top of the black fishnet stockings whose mesh is wide enough to insert three fingers ' (1985: 18) . Perhaps more disturbingly, McLeish's fantasies also tend towards sadism and the violent punishment of his female characters. The first half of the book is dominated by this material. McLeish imagines an 'orgasm race' featuring 'hordes of waitresses in tight red satin slinky button-through dresses' which 'must come before the last and biggest gangbang which will leave me completely exhausted and unconscious' (119).
The novel's depictions of sex and the erotic are not occasional but obsessive. The book is about a pornographic imagination, and it accordingly, unabashedly becomes almost identical with pornography itself.
There can be little doubt that this novel would have contravened the law on the printed word prior to 1959. Even at a much later date, its sexual obsessiveness is remarkable. Yet the work as a whole is far more complex than the summary above suggests. It ultimately shows McLeish's pornographic mentality to be symptomatic of his failures in life, even of a whole political era. Steeped in pornography, the novel is also a critique of a society in which pornography is so prevalent. With extraordinary determination, Gray's book does everything that had been deplored both by traditional morality and by the feminist critique of pornography -while also exemplifying and endorsing that very critique. McLeish comes to understand that his fantasy of female entrapment is a projection from his own fearful existence: 'The woman is corrupted into enjoying her bondage and trapping others into it. I did not Even so, pornography cannot necessarily be contained so cleanly. Gray himself, asked about the book's use of sexual fantasy for a critique of masculinity, has blithely admitted: 'Oh it does a bit, aye, but the thing is, I quite enjoyed writing the sadistic nasty bits' (Boyd 1991: 113) . S.J. Boyd cites this remark and worries about the sexual content of Gray's work. He allows 1982 Janine its justification, but in Gray's later novel Something Leather he finds a more plainly reactionary -indeed 'outrageous and dangerous' -pornography (122). Boyd does not, of course, call for the later novel to be banned. He is doubtless aware that the legal instruments to do so no longer effectively exist. In any case, he would value Gray's artistic freedom of expression over his own political or aesthetic disagreement with the work. Here is the place of the erotically charged work of fiction by the 1990s: its politics and effects might be questioned or decried, but this has no implication for its right to exist and readers' right to experience it.
The same principles apply, more extensively, to Martin Amis. Far more than Alasdair Gray, Amis has earned a degree of public notoriety for his treatment of sex and gender relations (Dyer 1989: 62) Within the first few pages his narrator John Self has walked into a New York bar and started watching strippers:
there writhed a six-foot Mex with wraparound mouth, hot greasy breasts, and a furrow of black hair on her belly which crept like a trail of gunpowder into the sharp white holster of her pants. Now this is a bit more fucking like it, I
thought. In my experience you can tell pretty well all you need to know about a woman by the amount of time, thought and money she puts into her pants. Money does not depict an especially large amount of actual sexual intercourse. But sexuality, desire, and specifically the kind of pornographic imagination instanced here are pervasive through the novel. From the start, the reader is confronted with a realm of strip joints, pornographic magazines and male entitlement (albeit coupled with male doubt and insecurity) which may well be uncomfortably unfamiliar. We watch Self in bedroom encounters with his partner, who relays sexual fantasies to him while wearing 'an extended black bodice that clasped between her thighs, and chrome stockings, and golden shoes' (73). Later he tells us of a session auditioning young actresses who are all asked to undress: a 'sun-bleached, snowblind vigil of booze and lies and pornography', in which the girls 'took most of their clothes off and gave you a lesson in their personal anatomy ' (197-8) . Self is ultimately undone 18 during two scenes in which he is tempted by the 'pornographic' sex that he considers his natural element (346, 369) .
Money is incendiary, to the point of illegality, by the older canons of taste that prevailed prior to the Obscene Publications Act. Yet the book's fascination with the pornographic does not necessarily make it a member of that category itself. Amis, in the interview quoted above, immediately resists the assimilation of his work to the category of pornography: 'It's very easy for me to decide that I don't write pornography, because I'm sure that one of the definitions of pornography would have to be that the creator of pornography is excited by it, and I'm not excited by anything except by how I'm going to arrange the words' (Tredell 2000: 64) . With this radical, even implausible aestheticization Amis steps away from the identification of his own work with pornography, and enshrines it once more as pure verbal art.
Amis knows, though, that pornography is no harmless, uncontroversial matter, even after a decade and more of decensorship. He even explicitly concedes that 'the feminists have got a very strong argument against pornography', apparently on the grounds that 'it's just a nasty way of making money for all the people who are in it' (Tredell 2000: 64) . As Kaye Mitchell (2012) has shown, Money emerged in a period when feminist debates around pornography were at their height. The novel takes on board this brand of the 'censorship of Enlightenment'.
John Self looks in a bookstore window at 'the most recent scrotum-tightener from the feminist front': Not On Our Lives, by Karen Krankwinkl, maintains that 'all lovemaking was rape, even when it didn't seem that way to either of the participants' (136). This is a satirical version of the radical feminism of Andrea Dworkin, a leading voice on the branch of feminism that wished to ban pornography. The novel depicts that campaign more explicitly in a British context, when Self is looking at pornographic magazines in a local newsagent's, and finds the magazine torn from his grasp by 'A plump, pretty girl with a sensible scarf, two badges on the lapel of her corduroy overcoat, her face and stance vibrant, unflinching, exalted' (158). The feminist demands 'Why aren't you ashamed of yourself?' and 'How can you look at those things?'. Self's responses are disarmingly candid, admitting to his own shame and putting up no case in his defence. The novel is thus peculiarly self-conscious about the issues of gender and exploitation: wallowing in pornography, it also gives voice to a characteristic contemporary opponent of pornography. Yet the feminist does not quite go unanswered. The novel also features a character called Martin Amis, avatar of its author, who meets John Self in a cafe soon afterwards. A witness to the scene in the newsagent's, Amis tells Self '"I thought you handled yourself pretty well, considering"', and suggests that '"you could have argued that the man [in the pornographic magazine] was being exploited too"' (176-7). Characteristically, Amis seeks not so much to deny feminism as to incorporate and outbid it: precisely the manoeuvre that Adam Mars-Jones (1997: 128-56) would find so recurrent in his work.
The author of Money plainly understood what was considered offensive, and headed straight for it. Feminists have recorded their offence at Amis's work, notably for its two-dimensional depiction of women. When Amis's novel London Fields (1989) failed to appear on the Booker Prize shortlist, others took umbrage on his behalf. Jane Ellison wrote that the book had been disqualified for its 'sleazy, nasty sex' (a claim denied by a Booker judge), and defended it by asserting that it was women writers who were primarily responsible for 'trashy, lurid blockbusters' full of 'pornographic sex' (Tredell 2000: 97-9) . Clearly the intersection of literature, pornography and misogyny was a site for critical argument at the end of the 1980s.
Yet the debate necessarily remains in the realm of offence -or even, less emotively, of disagreement about the view of women suggested by Amis's fiction -rather than of censorship. Amis's critics might yearn for a period of silence from him, but none has called for his work to be banned for its proximity to pornography. The work is clearly self-conscious about the contested area into which it cheerfully intervenes: to the point where a feminist critic can cautiously state that 'in his fictional and nonfictional treatments of pornography, Amis might be seen as adding to and extending our understanding of it' (Mitchell 2012: 93) .
A third example from the period shows how literature, decades after the Chatterley trial, could still provoke real anger and controversy. Philip Larkin died in 1985, but his profile rose again in 1992-3 when a volume of letters and biography were published. Some readers were shocked at what was revealed. In his private letters, many spiced with swear words, Larkin had (often with self-amusing irony) expressed views far to the political Right and casually disparaged black and Asian people. The poet Tom Paulin (1992a) commented that the racist letters' 'obscenity' (by which he seemed to mean 'moral enormity') 'simply adds to the ever-increasing barrage of racial abuse which persons of colour presently endure in this societyarguably it lends credence to such prejudice and to the increasing number of racial attacks in Britain'. The literary academic Lisa Jardine (1992) stated with satisfaction: 'Actually, we don't tend to teach Larkin much now in my Department of English.
The Little Englandism he celebrates sits uneasily within our revised curriculum, which seeks to give all of our students, regardless of background, race or creed, a voice within British culture'. The poems might be worth studying to discover 'the parochial beliefs which lie behind them', but could not be defended as 'humane' 20 when 'the student who consults the selected Larkin letters in the college library confronts a steady stream of casual obscenity, throwaway derogatory remarks about women, and arrogant disdain for those of different skin colour or nationality'. The veteran critic John Bayley (1993) hardly the case', he reasons, 'that "fuck", "crap" and "piss" have suddenly turned into outmoded words in English poetry. It is rather that the letters went on sale at a time of immense political turmoil that enabled us to understand, much to our frustration, how Larkin's four-letter words issued from a conservatism that the nation had increasingly come to despise' (Bristow 1994: 160) . The claim about 'the nation' looks ambitious. But Bristow is plausible in arguing for the compound nature of Larkin's offence. Obscenity alone may be tolerable. But when combined with other politically objectionable material, it has an additional inflammatory effect.
The Larkin case was a notable practical instance of disputes over the politics of writing, contemporaneous with the 'culture wars' in the United States (Bérubé 1994) . One anonymous librarian declared that Larkin should be banned from library shelves, but others at the Library Association's Record rejected the call ('D.S.' 1993).
Larkin had once, famously, mentioned 'the end of the Chatterley ban' in a poem.
There was no prospect of Larkin's work being prohibited from sale as Lawrence's had been. The strongest conceivable outcome of his perceived offence was to be removed from a particular syllabus. More mildly and more commonly, his work would continue to be studied, but in a context that emphasized its political hinterland as a negative dimension. That seemed the implication of Paulin's complaint (1992a) that the letters had in fact been too censored already by their 21 editor Anthony Thwaite. Instead they should be published unexpurgated, with an Introduction that 'sought to place, analyse and understand -socially and psychologically -Larkin's racism, misogyny and quasi-fascist views', because 'We need to understand the culture that produced these monstrous hatreds'. This is a long way from censorship. In a sense it is the opposite: 'Let us have the missing [possibly racist] passages in print', Paulin repeated the following month (1992b). Yet it still suggests a form of culpatory special treatment. The implicit assumption appears to be that the work, if not carefully neutralized by contextual critique, could be harmful. In this respect the leftist response to work it deems objectionable retains something of the model that had long been present in censorship debates. Literature might not 'deprave', but without critical care it might still 'corrupt'.
The Rushdie Affair
When the Williams Report hypothesized a public protest that could cause offence, it These last two examples take us beyond both Britain and literature proper.
But they contributed to a sense that the most explosive offence today relates to religion, rather than concerns about obscenity which now seem all but extinguished in the United Kingdom. In Britain the emphasis on religion as basic to one's identity was encouraged by the Christian Prime Minister Tony Blair, who promoted 'faith schools' where children would be taught by clerics. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 conformed to this climate, in its implication that religion should be given special protection. The Act amends the Public Order Act 1986. It specifies that it is an offence to speak, write, publish, perform or broadcast with the intention of 'stirring up religious and racial hatred'. The legislation was controversial, especially as prior to amendment it proposed to make an offence of 'threatening, insulting and abusive' language in relation to race or religion. Writers, comedians and civil liberties campaigners, including the National Secular Society and English PEN, recognized that the banning of 'insult' to religion was profoundly illiberal and retrogressive, though partially typical of the religiosity favoured by the Prime Minister. The bill was amended on its passage through Parliament, and in its final form the legislation specified both that offences must be 'threatening' (mere abuse and insult were no long proscribed) and that the effects of threat or hatred must be intentional. This appears to lessen the legislation's capacity to diminish legitimate free speech in the name of religion.
The State of Censorship and the Nature of Offence
The censorship of printed literature for obscenity was considered to be a Religion, however, has re-emerged as a ground on which censorship might justify itself. Since the Satanic Verses furore, the idea has gained traction that a work could offend on religious grounds and might therefore merit restriction: either to protect the sensibilities of those who claim to be offended, or on the more pragmatically prudent grounds that the text's circulation increases the likelihood of social disorder. The case of Behzti shows that similar pressures can apply to the 25 theatre. As Mark Lawson (2005: 10) puts it: 'at least in theatrical terms, God is the new sex'. In terms of the history of censorship, this is arguably a surprising development. It threatens to reverse the long-established direction of travel toward greater liberalization.
In the course of this essay we have observed a tendency for the legal prohibition of 'obscenity' to be replaced by the looser, usually less official fact of 'offence'. Had Lord Longford's Quixotic campaign succeeded, 'to outrage contemporary standards of decency' would be ground for prosecution. As it is, simply to offend is not generally a legal matter -however culturally explosive it may be in the realm of instant publication, reaction and debate furnished by the internet. This robust line has been taken by two of the most intelligent recent commentators on the question of offence. Stefan Collini, in a polemical book on the subject, outlines the peculiar character of offence, as an emotionally subjective matter that nonetheless tends to lay claim to broader standards of agreement. Even though it appears that 'if someone does not feel offended, then they have not been offended', offence normally also involves 'some element of conviction that such a reaction is legitimate or justified. [...] [It] is not simply on account of some odd quirk or susceptibility of our own that we find ourselves offended ' (2010: 11-12) . Collini notes that questions of criticism and offence have lately acquired 'a new complexity and a new urgency', because of the tendency for 'offended' persons to speak on behalf of the underprivileged or minorities. Liberals, Collini perceives, are torn between 'treating all other people with equal respect', and giving special dispensation to those who can claim to be victims of 'existing disadvantages ' (2010: 6 ). Yet he insists that criticism must not restrain itself simply because another party may claim to be offended: 'in those societies where relatively free public discussion is not just Collini seeks to put offence in its place, and weigh the rights of criticism against it.
Connor virtually denies all validity to the category of offence. He seems to deem it a phantom feeling: not a genuine emotional basis for action, but a fiction concocted in order to further one's own manoeuvres for authority. His case is extreme, and provocative -though like Collini he makes the plausible point that offence is very often taken (and Connor insists on the active sense in which this must be done) on behalf of others who may not have felt or expressed any offence themselves. This much was surely true of the clerics who first stirred protest against The Satanic Verses. We need not necessarily endorse Connor's bracing, thoroughgoing scepticism about offence. Yet we can concur with Collini's liberal view that the claim of offence, where actual harm is not threatened, should not be allowed to outweigh the freedom to inquire and criticize.
A last complexity merits remark. The official prosecution and banning of a work may be the most thoroughgoing way to limit the circulation of ideas and Arguably, freedom of public artistic expression depends not only on the absence of state censorship but also on a structure of cultural production and dissemination that actively protects diversity, and offers exposure to art that is not produced primarily for commercial ends. The Williams Report itself made this point, in differing from Mill's belief in a free market of ideas: 'falsehood indeed may prevail, if powerful agencies can gain an undue hold on the market'. 'Intervention', Williams concluded, was justified: 'it can take the form of such things as state subventions for the arts, or policies of refusing to design television programmes solely on the basis of ratings, or subsidising institutions of critical enquiry ' (1981: 55) .
The absence of such policies can restrict diversity. We could thus say that censorship, in practice, can be a 'sin of omission' as well a determined activity. All this is pertinent to British society at the end of the period surveyed by this book.
That is because the spread of neo-liberal values as political norms, within and without Britain, has threatened the future of institutions like the BBC, or indeed public higher education, which help to underwrite a mixed cultural economy and to promote diversity. The 'censorship' that matters most in Britain in the decades to come may be the limitation unwittingly imposed by the market.
